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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Section 78-2-
2(3)(j), U.C.A. The appeal was referred to the Utah Court of Appeals under Section 
78-28-3(2)0). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issue presented is whether the district court erred as a matter of law 
granting summary judgment in favor of Ray's Gardening, L.L.C., by holding that the 
owner of a motor vehicle supplied to the employee operator is not subject to 
respondeat super/or when the vehicle is provided as part of the compensation of the 
employee. 
The standard of review for this issue is one of correctness, granting no 
deference to the legal conclusions of the district court. Woodbury Amsource, Inc. 
v. Salt Lake County, 2003 UT. 28, fl 4, 73 P.3d 362. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Appellant claims that this case presents a matter of first impression under 
Utah law and there is no determinative law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an action for personal injury and loss of consortium in an intersection 
collision wherein the parties dispute the color of the traffic signal for the Defendant 
when he entered the intersection. Plaintiff claims the owner of the defendant's 
vehicle, his employer, should be responsible for defendant's negligence under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint for personal injury and loss of consortium on 
August 29,2002. (R. at 1). Routine Answer by the Defendants and discovery took 
place. (R. at 16-38). On June 2,2003, Defendant, Ray's Gardening, L.L.C., filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 39). Oral argument on the motion was held 
on September 11, 2003ith the Court entering a formal Order Granting Summary 
Judgment on September 26,2003. (R. at 92). Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal 
on October 21, 2003. (R. at 95). 
Note that Defendant Nielsen is not a party to this appeal and that the trial court 
litigation continues against him. The district court stated in its summary judgment 
that the ruling in favor of Ray's Gardening, L.L.C., was a final judgment for purposes 
of appeal. (R. at 93). 
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C. DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Ray's Gardening, L.L.C., 
against the Plaintiff. (R. at 92). 
RELEVANT FACTS 
On August 2, 2001, Plaintiff, Honi Thompson, was driving her motor vehicle 
westbound on 12600 South Street in Salt Lake County where it intersects with 2700 
West Street. (R. at 2). The Defendant, Jaren Nielsen, was driving a motor vehicle 
in the opposite direction at the same time. (R. at 2). Thompson turned left and was 
impacted by the Defendant's vehicle. (R. at 2). The primary issue for trial is that 
Plaintiff claims Defendant ran a red light and Defendant denies the same. (R. at 2, 
17). 
The truck operated by the Defendant was owned by Ray's Gardening. (R. at 
55,61). The truck was part of the benefit package from Ray's Gardening, L.L.C., to 
Jaren Nielsen for his employment as a supervisor or foreman of the company. (R. 
at 58, 61). 
The scope of permission for use of the truck was that it may be used for 
employment purposes and personal use. (R. at 61). Plaintiffs do not dispute that 
Defendant Nielsen was using the truck for his own personal purposes at the time of 
the accident. (R. at 42). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case presents facts of first impression in Utah to determine when an 
employer may be held responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle by an 
employee. Prior case law in Utah has established a continuum of liability with an 
employee during work hours operating an employer's vehicle causing the employer 
to be liable on one end of the continuum. On the other end of the continuum, Utah 
courts have held that an employee operating a motor vehicle owned by an employer 
while the employee is outside of the scope of employment does not create liability 
in the employer. The facts here fall in between those poles. Here, the employee 
admitted to be on personal business on his own time but the vehicle is part of a 
compensation package from the employer to the employee. 
This brief examines the policy behind imputing liability from an employee to 
an employer and explains to the Court that when the employer gets a benefit from 
compensating the employee by allowing the employee to use a vehicle owned by the 
employer, those polices of imputing liability attach. 
ARGUMENT 
A. POLICY IMPUTING LIABILITY 
That liability can be imputed from an employee to an employer is not new to 
the law. As stated in Clark v. Pangan, 2000 UT 37, fl 8, 998 P.2d 268, the Utah 
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Supreme Court "has long recognized" that employers can be held vicariously liable 
under the theory of respondeat superior. In order to determine when liability is to be 
imputed, the Utah Supreme Court recognized a three pronged test in Birknerv. Salt 
Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989). These tests are discussed in greater 
detail below as the purpose of this section is to discuss the policy behind imputing 
liability. 
Though Clark was concerned with an intentional tort, the case contains a 
recent affirmation of the general policy for imputing liability. Quoting from 27 Am.Jur. 
2d Employment Relationship § 459 (1996), the Utah Supreme Court recognized at 
T[ 7 that liability is imputed to prevent the recurrence of tortious conduct, to give 
greater assurance of compensation for the victim, and to ensure that the victim's 
losses will be equitably borne by those who benefit from the enterprise that gave rise 
to the injury. The Utah Supreme Court also recognized there that fundamental to the 
policy is that an employer is best able to control the conduct of the employee. 
Commentators recognize that a legitimate basis to allocate liability arises from 
the structure of economic and business practices which put employers in a better 
position to pay for wrongful acts. In Harper, James & Grey, 5 The Law of Torts § 
26.1 at 7 (2d. ed. 1986), it is explained that as a matter of public policy wrongful acts 
of employees are imputed to employers because of the employer's better position 
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to include loss in the cost of business. Suits against tortfeasors alone would 
otherwise end up often being suits against people with no or little resources, 
accomplishing little in protecting injured persons. 
Similarly, in 20 Personal Injury, Master & Servant, Section 2.03[8], it is 
explained that the law recognizes loss allocation to employers, as a matter of public 
policy, though the rules on how that allocation is to be calculated may vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
Examples of courts addressing allocation of fault include Sage Club v. Hunt, 
638 P.2d 161 (Wyo. 1981), wherein the wrongful intentional acts of a bartender were 
imputed to an employer in part because the court recognized that the employer is 
situated, as a matter of public policy, to bear the loss as a cost of doing business. 
In Lazar v. Thermal Equipment Corp., 158 Cal. App. 3d 458 (1983) a driver 
using a vehicle on a personal errand had liability imputed to his employer where it 
was foreseeable that the employer's truck would be used for personal errands. 
Some courts have adopted the "roving commission" theory. For example, in 
Wahlen v. Hill, 219 So.2d 727 (Fla. App. 1969), an employee's liability was imputed 
to an employer where the employer had given a general permission to operate the 
vehicle broadly. See also, Easterlin v. Green, 150 S.E.2d 473 (S.C. 1966) (also 
considering the roving commission theory). 
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Put simply, what courts are looking for in imputing liability between an 
employee and an employer are the circumstances in which public policy is promoted 
to provide a resource for remedy of plaintiffs. That policy includes not just control 
of the employee's acts at the time of any particular accident, but whether the 
relationships are such that loss may fairly be allocated from the employee to the 
employer. Implementation of that policy in Utah has been via the Birkner test 
mentioned above and discussed below. 
Utah law is well settled that an employee in an employer's truck while doing 
the employer's business would impute liability to the employer. The other side of the 
scale is being outside of the employment time and relationship and on a personal 
errand in one's own vehicle. This particular case falls between the poles. Here, the 
employee admits to being on his own business, but is operating a vehicle which is 
owned by the employer and provided to the employee, as part of his pay and 
benefits, to use however he sees fit. The question presented is whether these are 
the kinds of qualitative circumstances in which public policy would dictate that liability 
be imputed to the employer. 
The discussion which follows shows that respondeat superior may be applied 
to this case because the employer derives a benefit from this kind of relationship 
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with the employee so that it is equitable to allocate such loss as a cost of doing 
business. 
B. THE QUALITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RAY'S GARDENING 
AND NIELSEN IS SUFFICIENT TO IMPUTE LIABILITY 
1. Introduction. 
Ray's Gardening may be liable either directly, under the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 317 (1965), or derivatively, under a theory of respondeat 
superior. The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that the basis upon which 
liability is ultimately predicated is irrelevant, as is the relationship among those liable 
for a tort. See Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 1349,1351-52 (Utah 1986), quoting 
Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747, 748 (Del. 1978). What is relevant is whether 
those liable for a tort are liable "severally." See id. Thus, whether liability of Ray's 
Gardening is derivatively-based, as with respondeat superior, or whether liability 
rests on direct, actionable fault, it is of no concern to the Plaintiff here. 
2. Liability Under Restatement of Torts. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 317 declares a master liable where the 
servant acts outside the scope of the employment creating an unreasonable risk of 
bodily harm if the servant is using a chattel of the master. Put in the context of this 
case, Nielsen, while driving a truck owned by Ray's Gardening, makes Ray's 
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Gardening liable for his negligence. The record shows that there was virtually no 
control from Ray's Gardening to Nielsen concerning the use of a truck. In fact, as 
the principal officer of Ray's Gardening, LLC, stated in his deposition, Nielsen could 
use the truck for whatever he wants. (R. at 61). 
The application of Restatement § 317 does not turn on any test trying to 
determine whether the employee was within the scope of employment. A trial is 
needed to determine whether a broad grant of permission to use a vehicle owned 
by an employer, as an employee sees fit, is lack of reasonable control. 
3. Respondeat Superior. 
While there are a number of cases in Utah law considering the test for whether 
an employee is within the scope of employment for the purpose of imputing liability 
to the employer, an oft-cited case is Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 
(Utah 1989). Though Birkner involved intentional misconduct, tests applicable to all 
situations were articulated. Largely following the Restatement (Second) of Agency, 
Section 228 (1958), the Utah Supreme Court articulated that conduct is within the 
scope of employment if (1) the activity is of the kind an employee is employed to 
perform; (2) the act occurs substantially within authorized time and space limits of 
the employer; and (3) the activity is motivated at least in part by a purpose to serve 
the master. See also Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, (Utah 1991) 
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which applies the three part text of Birkner to determine respondeat superior in a 
negligence case. 
While the tests stated above try to provide a bright line for imputing liability, 
this particular case does not fit well into these tests. Specifically, even the personal 
use of the automobile, in this case, is a benefit to the employer. Both the Nielsens 
and Mr. Holt make very clear that Nielsen understands it is not his vehicle, and that 
he is allowed to drive it as part-payment for the work that he does for Ray's 
Gardening, L.L.C. What that means, is that Jaren Nielsen gives Ray's Gardening, 
L.L.C. benefit through his work, and the vehicle is given to him for personal use just 
as if he were paid cash. Ray's Gardening remains, at all times, the owner of the 
vehicle, thus demonstrating Ray's Gardening's acceptance of the risk of Jaren 
Nielsen's negligent driving. Therefore, there is no reason to distinguish between an 
accident occurring during the work day and an accident during personal time when 
the operation of the vehicle is in both circumstances for the benefit of the employer. 
After all, the employer owns and may insure, as addressed below, the vehicle 
continuously—without regard to whether the employee is running personal errands 
or is acting in the course and scope of his employment. Thus, since the employer 
receives a benefit from the mere fact that the employee accepts the benefit of driving 
the employer-provided vehicle, then the employee is, in effect, acting in the course 
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and scope of his employment each and every moment in which he drives the 
employer-provided vehicle. 
In Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 2003 UT 4, 73 P.3d 315, a police 
officer was involved in an automobile accident driving a marked patrol car home 
while off-duty. The Court would not find the city liable by application of what it called 
the "coming and going rule" found in Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance 
Company, 801 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989). The Court recognized the major premise of 
the rule—that it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer for conduct of 
its employees over which it has no control and from which it derives no benefit. 
That premise, however, seems inapplicable where the vehicle the employee 
is driving is owned by the employer and provided to the employee as part of a 
compensation package. A vehicle, owned and insured by the employer, that 
necessarily can be taken away from the employee, remains substantially under the 
control of the employer. 
Presumably, if Mr. Nielsen were to quit or be discharged from his job, the 
vehicle would remain with the employer. The employer benefits from the employee's 
use of the automobile because by providing the automobile to the employee as a 
benefit of employment, the employer is able to pay the employee a smaller dollar 
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salary and receive the benefit of the work done equal to or greater than the value of 
the truck. 
A New Jersey court has recognized that an employer-provided vehicle acts 
as an incentive for an employee to work, and remain working, for the employer. See 
Pfender v. Torres, 765 A.2d 208 (N.J. Super. 2001). The New Jersey court also 
found that the benefits of the employer-provided vehicle, even when driven on 
personal business, advanced the employer's interests sufficiently to impose vicarious 
liability. 
In Pfender, a lawsuit was brought by an injured pedestrian against the driver 
of an automobile and its owner, an auto dealership. At the time of the accident, the 
conduct of the vehicle's driver was personal, and not within the scope of his 
employment. The driver was a salesman who was provided the vehicle to use as a 
demonstrator and to use in the course of employment. The court held that the 
employer could be liable for harm caused by the employee where the use of the 
vehicle advanced the employer's business or interests. The Pfender court found that 
providing a car to its employees benefitted the employer by acting as an incentive 
for the employee to work for the employer, and as a promotional device, as well. 
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Plaintiff recognizes the Utah Supreme Court warned in Ahlstrom that the mere 
fact the employer derives any benefit from the conduct will not create liability. The 
court there, however, said that if the employee engages in conduct benefitting the 
employer, the personal nature of the benefit will be weighed against the nature of the 
trip to determine if it is appropriate to place liability. The court also left open for the 
future when liability should attach for employer-provided transportation. In short, the 
question provided by this case is an open question, addressed, thus far, only by New 
Jersey. 
This Court should impose liability here because of the weighing dictated by 
Ahlstrom. That is, the allowed personal use of the vehicle is* payment for the direct 
work of Nielsen to the employer. This converts mere personal use to a benefit to the 
employer, just as if Nielsen was operating the vehicle in the course of the work day. 
The principle of attaching liability in Pfender because of benefit received 
applies to this case. There is no reasonable dispute that Nielsen uses this vehicle 
actively during the work day, and then takes it home at night as part-payment for that 
which he does as a foreman on the job. The benefit received by Ray's Gardening 
is the same benefit as that received by the auto dealer in Pfender. That is, the 
employee is encouraged to work for the company for this benefit, on top of pay 
received, by having an insured vehicle for personal use. The employer should, as 
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a matter of policy, carry the responsibility of the vehicle at all times because the 
employer receives the benefit of personal use of the vehicle by the employee, and 
is in the best position to accept the risk of its negligent use—especially considering 
the fact that the employer in this case has foreseen the possibility of the employee's 
negligence, and indeed insured against that possibility. In fact, the Utah legislature 
also apparently considered this when it adopted § 41-12a-410, which requires that 
when the operator of a motor vehicle is employed by the vehicle's owner, "the 
department shall accept proof of security by the owner in lieu of proof by the 
employee." 
As is typical in personal injury litigation, the record in this case does not 
indicate who provided insurance for the Ray's Gardening vehicle. However, in 
considering the policy of whether to impute liability when a vehicle is operated for 
personal use but provided as a payment for services by an employer, the court can 
certainly consider Section 41-12a-301, U.C.A. That statute requires every owner of 
a motor vehicle in Utah, in conjunction with Section 31A-22-302, to obtain liability 
insurance. Here, assuming that Ray's Gardening insured the vehicle in 
conformance with law against the risk of Jaren Nielsen's negligent driving is, in and 
of itself, evidence of the control Ray's Gardening had over the vehicle, and of Jaren 
Nielsen's role as an extension of Ray's Gardening while he was operating the 
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vehicle. In St. Joseph Hospital v. Wolff, 999 S.W.2d 579,595 (Tex. App. 1999), the 
court held that evidence that a hospital provided a surgeon with malpractice 
insurance was admissible to show the hospital's responsibility for any negligence on 
the part of the surgeon. In this case, an owner insuring the vehicle is evidence that 
public policy supports Ray's Gardening having responsibility for negligence of a 
permissive operator of the vehicle. 
The economic costs of the tort are "caused" by the business that provided Mr. 
Nielsen with a vehicle for personal use. Costs such as these must be used to 
determine the scale at which to operate the business (i.e., the number of vehicles 
to purchase, the extent to which employees may use them, the scope and amount 
of insurance coverage to purchase), and in designing incentives within the 
organization to encourage employees to drive carefully when the business grants 
them permission to use a vehicle. See Alan Q. Sykes, "The Boundaries of Vicarious 
Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related 
Doctrines," 101 Harv. L. Rev. 563, 595 (Jan. 1988). 
Of course, that the vehicle owner happens also to be the employer of the 
permissive driver, blurs the line between a vehicle owner's financial responsibility for 
the negligence of his permissive driver and the liability of an employer under the 
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doctrine of respondeat superior. The court should not let this blurring of lines hinder 
the ultimate result. 
It is not beyond reason that a court would impose liability on an employer who 
owns and insures a vehicle, and who permits an employee to operate that vehicle 
at home and at work. 
Based on the above, the court should find that, where the employer provides 
and insures a vehicle for an employee, the employer remains vicariously liable for 
the employee's negligent operation of that vehicle without regard to the type of 
activity in which the employee is engaged at the time of the accident. 
CONCLUSION 
This brief has shown that Utah law has an open question of whether 
ownership of a vehicle by an employer is a sufficient legal connection to impute 
liability for the operation of that vehicle by the employee to the employer. This Court 
should allow the imputing of liability because when a vehicle is part of the pay of an 
employee, the employer is getting a benefit which may be presumed to actually have 
more value than the vehicle itself, or there would be no economic reason to include 
the vehicle in the benefit case. Additionally, Utah law requires every owner, 
including the employer in this case, to get insurance for its vehicles, so allocation of 
risk to employers has already taken place as a practical matter. This Court should 
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recognize that under these circumstances Ray's Gardening should be required to 
participate in the trial of the underlying action. 
The Court is requested to reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
and remand the claim against Ray's Gardening, L.L.C., for trial. 
DATED this 7th day of April, 2004. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
GREG( 
MARGAREJ R. WAKEHAM 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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COMPLAINT 
GREGORY J. SANDERS, #2858 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Telephone: (801)521-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
HONI THOMPSON and 
DAVID THOMPSON, 
Plaintiffs, COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND 
vs. 
JAREN L. NIELSEN and Civil No. 
RAY'S GARDENING, L.C., : j^ e Liv/mqstw^ 
Defendants. : 
Plaintiffs allege and complain against Defendants as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiffs are husband and wife residing in Riverton, Utah. 
2. Jaren L. Nielsen is an adult residing in Riverton, Utah. 
h3 
3. Ray's Gardening is a Utah limited liability company in Riverton, Utah, that owned 
the vehicle driven by Mr. Nielsen at all times relevant. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
4. On August 2, 2001, at approximately 6:12 p.m. Honi Thompson was driving her 
motor vehicle westbound on 12600 South Street where it intersects with 2700 West Street. 
5. Plaintiff intended to make a left-hand turn at that intersection which is controlled by 
a standard traffic light. 
6. Plaintiff waited in the intersection for the oncoming traffic to clear and then made her 
left turn when the light for her travel direction turned red. 
7. Meanwhile, Defendant Jaren Nielsen was operating a motor vehicle eastbound on 
2700 West in the opposite direction of Plaintiff. 
8. Defendant Nielsen entered the intersection after the light turned red for his direction 
and thereby collided with the Plaintiff, who was turning southbound. 
9. As a consequence of the collision between the two vehicles, Plaintiff has sustained 
substantial injury with medical expenses in excess of $35,000, has sustained permanent physical 
injury, and has been restricted in life activities and will yet incur substantial future medical costs and 
associated injury including pain and suffering. 
CAUSE OF ACTION - NEGLIGENCE 
10. Defendant, Jaren Nielsen, at the time and placed stated, was operating a motor vehicle 
in a negligent fashion including, but not limited to, failure to keep a proper lookout for the vehicle 
of the Plaintiff and failing to stop for the red light in his direction. 
-2-
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11. Jaren Nielsen was operating with consent a motor vehicle owned by Ray's Gardening 
in the course and scope of his permissive use and in furtherance of the interests of Ray's Gardening. 
Consequently, Ray's Gardening has legal responsibility for the negligence of Jaren Nielsen. 
CAUSE OF ACTION - CONSORTIUM 
12. On the date of the accident described above, David Thompson and Honi Thompson 
were husband and wife residing together in a typical marital relationship. 
13. The injuries received because of the negligence of the Defendants have made Honi 
Thompson incapable of performing the types of jobs she performed before the injury and has 
interfered with the care, comfort and society which Honi Thompson can give to David Thompson 
and has otherwise damaged their marital relationship. 
14. The injuries recited above constitute a loss of consortium under §30-2-11 of the Utah 
Code for which this court should enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff David Thompson. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff asks the court to enter judgment jointly and severally against the 
Defendants as follows: 
1. A finding of negligience in the operation of the Nielsen vehicle. 
2. A finding of responsibility for the operation of the Nielsen vehicle *&d Ray's 
Gardening. 
3. An award of medical costs incurred of at least $35,000 plus such future costs as may 
be reasonably incurred in an amount to be proved at trial. 
4. An award for the reduction of earning capacity and support services for household 
needs. 
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5. An award for personal disfiguration and permanent injury including pain and 
suffering of not less than $250,000. 
6. An award for loss of consortium i& an amount proven at trial. 
7. An award for such other relief as may be appropriate in law and in fact. 
JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury as provided in Rule 38. 
DATED THIS £*) day of August, 2002. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
GREG^L¥^SANDERS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
-4-
A-(, 
DEPOSITION OF 
JAREN NIELSEN 
k-1 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONI THOMPSON and DAVID 
THOMPSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAREN L. NIELSEN and RAY'S ) 
GARDENING, L.C., ) 
Defendants. ) 
i Deposition of: 
) JAREN NIELSEN 
Case No.: 020908556 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
April 25, 2003 
9:05 a.m. to 9:35 a.m. 
Location: LAW OFFICE OF STRONG & HANNI 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Reporter: Judy A. Holdeman,-RPR, CSR 
Notary Public in and tor the State of- Utah 
GARCIA fef LOVE 
teORT aEPORTHE AID VIQEOGfiRPRV 
36 South State Street • Suite 1220 • Salt Lake City, UT 84111 • 801 538 2333 • Fax 8 0 1 . 5 3 8 . 2 3 3 4 
V f&\£.U&*M /,. . . J - . - . . ^ j f VJ-T-^yn-"- ,^Kf t«'.^'SgR'^5^»7=!^ ,V--^ ,J.r' 
M 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
B 
9 
D 
i 
I 
3 
\ 
5 
intersection? 
MR. SANDERS: Yes, this side. 
A. My side? 
Q. The opposite side. This is the west side. 
But there is another line on the other side, typically, 
between the comers. 
A. Okay. 
Q. I am trying to figure out: Did you stop 
with the boat still in the intersection? Or were you 
down the road? 
A. No. I pulled enough away so that the boat 
was out of the intersection because I wasn't sure what 
was behind me. I didn't want to cause any other 
problems. So I just tried to get off to the side of the 
road. 
Q. That was my next question: Whether you are 
aware of any trailing vehicles that were close to being 
involved in the collision? 
A. Any — what did you say? 
Q. Trailing vehicles? 
A. Trailing? I wasn't aware of it. That's 
what I was worried about. 
Q. Tell me about the damage to your truck. 
What was the damage like? 
A. I t was just the front driver's side that had 
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collapsed in a little bit. 
Q. When you say "driver's side," is it the 
fender side of the vehicle? Or is it the front end? \ 
A. The front, the front bumper. 
Q. Was it drivable? 
A. I t was drivable. Not — yes. 
Q. How did you leave the scene? Or how did the i 
vehicle leave the scene? 
A. I drove it to the mechanic's shop. 
Q. How far was that? 
A. Probably a mile and a half to two miles. 
Q. Any mechanical problems because of the 
collision as opposed to body damage? 
A. Not that I knew of at the time. 
Q. Was that diagnosed later? 
A. Like how specific? 
Q. Broken hoses? Did it need engine repair? i 
A. Not that I know of. You would have to get a 
report from them. 
Q. Any damage to the boat? 
A. Yes, the boat — because of me when I | 
slammed on my brakes, the boat slid up the trailer. And 
it — the front part of the — that holds the front of 
the boat had totally collapsed. And the boat slid up 
within about 2 inches of my tailgate. 
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Q. And what damage did the boat sustain? 
A. The support that holds the front of the boat 
was damaged. And then the bottom of the boat scraped on 
the trailer, which was also damaged. And that's it as 
far as I recall. 
Q. Do you know the cost to repair your truck? 
A. My truck? As I recall, I think it was 
between 3,000 and 3,500. 
Q. And the cost to repair your boat and 
trailer? 
A. As I recall, I think approximately 500. 
Q. And who repaired the truck? 
A. I t was Performance Place. 
Q. Who repaired the boat? 
A. Ralph's Boat Repair did the body damage. 
And Metal Craft Trailer fixed the trailer. 
Q. Do you still own the truck? 
MR. BULLOCK: Objection, assumes facts not 
in evidence. He never owned the truck. 
A. That's true. You have been saying "my 
truck." It's really not my truck. 
Q. (By Mr. Sanders) You never considered it 
your truck? J 
A. Officially, no. 
Q. You always considered you were driving 
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Ray's Gardening's truck? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Did you make any alterations to Ray's truck? 
A. No. 
Q. All right. Do you still drive that truck? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you still have the boat? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The vehicle comes to a rest. What is the 
next thing you do? 
A. The first thing, I was somewhat in shock. I 
just made sure Kellie was okay, my wife. I made sure I 
was okay. 
Q. And were you and she? 
A. Yeah, physically what we could see, yes. 
Q. Okay. Sometimes after an accident, people 
start experiencing aches and pains. Did you have that 
experience? 
A. No. 
Q. Truck comes to a stop. You check each other 
out. What happens next? 
A. We got out of the truck. I first went up to 
the front of the truck — no, first I think I looked 
back to see the accident, the other vehicle involved. 
And then I — looked like people were around there 
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1 A. His responsibility is over the landscaping. 
2 Q. And he's - to put it in plain terms, he is 
3 part of your crew7 
4 A. He is the supervisor. 
5 Q. He supervises the crew? Did you give him a 
6 title like foreman or supervisor or just grandson? 
7 A. We just organized that a year ago. Foreman. 
8 Q. Foreman. But you didn't use that title at 
9 the time of the accident; is that correct? 
10 A. Yes. 
LI Q. But that was still the kind of 
L2 responsibility he had at the time of the accident, what 
L3 you call a foreman now? 
L4 A. Supervisor. I would say just supervisor. 
L5 Q. He would supervise what? 
L6 A. He would just supervise the crews that 
L7 worked for landscaping. 
L8 Q. Now, you heard - you have been present for 
19 the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Nielsen; is that correct? 
10 A. Yes. 
£1 Q. And you have heard them describe this truck 
£ as your truck; is that correct? 
>3 A. Say that again. 
M Q. You heard them say this truck involved in 
>5 the accident was your truck? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Well, now, let's draw the legal lines. Is 
3 it your truck personally or Ray's Gardening, LLCs 
4 truck? 
5 A. Well, I - actually it is in 
6 Ray's Gardening. 
7 Q. All right. 
8 A. Let me back off that. I have some in 
9 Ray's - in my own name and some in Ray's Gardening. 
LO You would have to look at the title on that one. 
LI Q. Do you know? Apparently you dont. Let me 
L2 show you. The police report just says, Owner, 
L3 Ray's Gardening. And, obviously, whatever it is, it is, 
14 and we can look it up. 
L5 But just sitting here today, does that tell 
L6 you that it is probably a company truck or one owned in 
U your own name? 
.8 A. I t would be a company truck. 
L9 Q. Now, is there any question in your mind as 
>0 the owner of the business that your grandson had 
>1 permission to use the truck at the time of the accident? 
>2 A. In what? 
13 Q. Is there any question in your mind that your 
>4 grandson had permission to use the truck at the time of 
>5 the accident? 
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1 A. No, he has permission. 
2 Q. And what was the scope of that permission? 
3 A. His permission is the truck is assigned to 
4 them. They can use it for personal use. They can use 
5 it for whatever they want. 
6 Q. All right. And why would you do that? 
7 A. Because that's just part of the program we 
8 have. 
9 Q. And program you mean benefits of the 
10 employees? 
11 A. Yes, just certain employees, yes. 
12 Q. All right Do you keep - well, who does -
13 at that time, who does your accounting work for your 
14 business? 
15 A. My wife. 
16 Q. And do you have knowledge as to how the 
17 giving of a use of a truck to Mr. Nielsen is accounted 
18 for on company records, if it is? 
19 A. There is none. 
20 Q. So you heard me ask the question earlier 
21 about W-2's Do you have any knowledge as to whether it 
22 is reflected on any kind of government record? 
23 A. No, it is not. 
24 Q. All right. So it is--there is nothing 
25 wrong with it. It is kind of a casual, this is a family 
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1 deal and Jaren works for me. And I let him use the 
2 truck as part of the benefit of working for me? 
3 A. That's true. 
4 Q. Okay. Thank you. Do you have personal 
5 knowledge of the value of the damage to the truck? 
6 A. The damage? 
7 Q. Yes. Do you know what the bill was to fix 
8 it? 
9 A. We just have a shop take care of it. I 
10 think he told me it was around $3,000 is all I know. 
11 Q. Now, did you go to the accident scene on the 
12 day of the accident? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Did you personally observe the damage to the 
15 vehicle? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. What is your memory of what the damage was? 
18 A. Well, I just looked at the front. I t was 
19 the front driver's side there. And then the repair guy 
20 that does all of our work told me what it was. At that 
21 point, that's all I am aware of. 
22 Q. Do you have any knowledge as to whether 
23 there was any engine damage in addition to body damage? 
24 A. No, not to — no, I don't think there was 
25 any engine damage. 
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1 Q. Okay. Did you observe the other vehicle to 
2 actually make the turn in front of you? 
3 A. I observed the van lurch forward and proceed 
4 to turn. 
5 Q. So the sudden movement is kind of a forward 
6 movement and then a turn? Or is it all one movement? 
7 A. One movement 
8 Q. And what, if anything, did you observe about 
9 the van itself in those brief moments that you had? 
.0 Were lights on? Or did you see anybody in it? Or 
.1 anything like that? 
.2 A. No. Just that it was present in the 
.3 intersection. 
4 Q. Do you remember the color of the van? 
5 A. I believe it was a tannish gray. 
6 Q. And what is your observation of what part of 
7 your vehicle hit what part of the other vehicle? 
8 A. My husband's work truck hit from the 
9 driver's side by the front headlight of the truck and a 
0 little bit around — that front driver's side corner hit 
1 the front of the van driver's side headlight and a 
2 little more towards the center of the grille. 
3 Q. The vehicles came to a rest. What did you 
4 do? 
5 A. Said to my husband, "Are you all right?" 
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1 x saia, "Yes, my nusoana is as wen." I 
2 said, "Are there any physical injuries?" 
3 And she said, "The air bag did deploy, and 
4 that's all I can see." 
5 Q. How long were you at the scene? 
6 A. By the time — from the collision to the 
7 time the tow truck pulled our boat away, I would say it 
8 was right near an hour. 
9 Q. Did you talk to any police officers while 
10 you were there? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. I will represent to you that the police 
13 report doesn't identify you as being on the scene. Do 
14 you have any knowledge of why that would be? 
15 A. I do not. I need to go back a little bit. 
16 I did talk to the police officer and say, "Do you need 
17 me to make a statement?" 
18 And he said, "We only need to speak to the 
19 driver." 
20 So that is my assumption of why I was not 
21 listed as present because he said he only needed to have 
22 the statement from the driver. 
23 Q. Have you had any contact with any people who 
24 identified themselves as eyewitnesses since the day of 
25 the accident? 
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1 Q. And his answer? 
2 A. " I think so. Are you all right?" 
3 Q. And your answer? 
4 A. "Yes, I am fine." 
5 Q. What did you do next? 
6 A. We got out of the truck. 
7 Q. Where did you go? 
B A. I proceeded toward the intersection. 
9 Q. For what purpose? 
0 A. To see if the driver of the van — to see 
1 what had happened. 
2 Q. Did you talk to the driver? 
3 A. I did not. 
4 Q. Did you talk to any eyewitnesses while you 
5 were on the scene? 
6 A. I talked to a woman. I do not know if she 
7 was an eyewitness or not. 
8 Q. What did she tell you? 
9 A. I said to the woman, "Are you the driver of 
0 the van?" 
1 She said, no, she was sitting in the car. 
2 She pointed to a Mitsubishi in the middle of the 
3 intersection. 
4 I said, "Is she all right?" 
5 She said, "She's very shaken up." 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. Did you have any contact with any law 
3 enforcement people concerning this accident since the 
4 day of the accident? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. You were careful to say a few minutes ago, 
7 "My husband's work truck." Tell me what you consider 
8 that truck to be. 
9 A. Exactly what I said, a work truck. He 
10 drives it to work. He drives it all day in the business 
11 of work. He drives it home. And it is part of his 
12 benefit's package to have that truck for both his work 
13 use and his personal use. 
14 Q. And --. 
15 A. But it is definitely Ray's truck. He takes 
16 very good care of it because it is not his. 
17 Q. And so as spouse, you consider that to be 
18 part of the pay your husband receives for his 
19 employment? 
20 A. I do. 
21 Q. And do you know - to set this up, for 
22 example, my work gives me a car to drive. At the end of 
23 the year, the value of that is added to my W-2. 
24 Do you know if thai: takes place with respect 
25 to your husband? 
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
SECTION 317 
Restatement of the Law - Torts 
Restatement of the Law Second - Torts 
Current through March 2003 
Copyright © 1965-2003 by the American Law Institute 
Division 2. Negligence 
Chapter 12. General Principles 
Topic 7. Duties Of Affirmative Action 
Title A. Duty To Control Conduct Of Third Persons 
§ 317. Duty Of Master To Control Conduct Of Servant 
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant 
while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from 
intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an 
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if (a) the servant 
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the 
servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or 
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and 
(b) the master 
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his 
servant, and 
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising 
such control. 
Copr. © 2002 The American Law Institute. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
SECTION 228 
A . T 2 . 
Restatement of the Law -- Agency 
Restatement (Second) of Agency 
Current through June 2003 
Copyright © 1958-2004 by the American Law Institute 
Chapter 7. Liability Of Principal To Third Person; Torts 
Topic 2. Liability For Authorized Conduct Or Conduct Incidental Thereto 
Title B. Torts Of Servants 
Scope Of Employment 
§ 228. General Statement 
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: 
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; 
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; 
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and (d) if 
force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is not 
unexpectable by the master. 
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in 
kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little 
actuated by a purpose to serve the master. 
Copr. © 2002 The American Law Institute. 
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UT ST § 41-12a-410 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-12a-410 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES 
CHAPTER 12a. MOTOR VEHICLE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
PART IV. PROOF OF OWNER'S OR OPERATOR'S SECURITY 
41-12a-410 Employee and family relationships. 
Whenever any person required to give proof of owner's or operator's security is an 
operator in the employ of any owner, or is a member of the immediate family or 
household of the owner, the department shall accept proof of security by the owner in 
lieu of proof by the employee, family, or household member. The department shall 
indicate by restriction on the operator's license the vehicles the operator may operate 
on the basis of that proof of security. 
A'tf 
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UT ST § 41-12a-301 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-12a-301 
c 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES 
CHAPTER 12a. MOTOR VEHICLE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
PART III. OWNER'S OR OPERATOR'S SECURITY REQUIREMENT 
41-12a-301 Definition --Requirement of owner's or operator's security Exceptions. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "highway" has the same meaning as provided in Section 41-la-102; and 
(b) "quasi-public road or parking area" has the same meaning as provided in 
Section 41-6-17.5. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (5) 
(a) every resident owner of a motor vehicle shall maintain owner's or operator's 
security in effect at any time that the motor vehicle is operated on a highway or 
on a quasi-public road or parking area within the state; and 
(b) every nonresident owner of a motor vehicle that has been physically present 
in this state for: 
(i) 90 or fewer days during the preceding 365 days shall maintain the type and 
amount of owner's or operator's security required in his place of residence, 
in effect continuously throughout the period the motor vehicle remains within 
Utah; or 
(ii) more than 90 days during the preceding 365 days shall thereafter maintain 
owner's or operator's security in effect continuously throughout the period the 
motor vehicle remains within Utah. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (5), the state and all of its political 
subdivisions and their respective departments, institutions, or agencies shall 
maintain owner's or operator's security in effect continuously for their motor 
vehicles. 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
A - 3 ^ 
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(b) Any.other state is considered a nonresident owner of its motor vehicles and 
is subject to Subsection (2)(b). 
(4) The United States, , any political subdivision of it, or any of its agencies may 
maintain owner's or operator's security in effect for their motor vehicles. 
(5) Owner's or operator's security is not required for any of the following: 
(a) off-highway vehicles registered under Section 41-22-3 when operated either: 
(i) on a highway designated as open for off-highway vehicle use; or 
(ii) in the manner prescribed by Section 41-22-10.3; 
(b) off-highway implements of husbandry operated in the manner prescribed by 
Subsections 41-22-5.5(3) through (5); 
(c) electric assisted bicycles as defined under Section 41-6-1; 
(d) motor assisted scooters as defined under Section 41-6-1; or 
(e) personal motorized mobility device as defined under Section 41-6-1. 
A-3H 
UCA§31A-22-302 
kVS 
Page 1 
Wfestlaw 
UT ST § 31A-22-302 
U.C.A. 1953 § 31A-22-302 
c 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE 
CHAPTER 22. CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 
PART III. MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE 
31A-22-302 Required components of motor vehicle insurance policies 
Exceptions. 
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy the 
owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301 shall include: 
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under Sections 31A-22-303 and 31A-22-304; 
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-3 05, unless affirmatively 
waived under Subsection 31A-22-305(4); and 
(c) underinsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-305, unless affirmatively 
waived under Subsection 31A-22-305(9). 
(2) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies, purchased to satisfy the 
owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301, except for 
motorcycles, trailers, and semitrailers, shall also include personal injury protection 
under Sections 31A-22-306 through 31A-22-309. 
(3) (a) First party medical coverages may be offered or included in policies 
issued to motorcycle, trailer, and semitrailer owners or operators. 
(b) Owners and operators of motorcycles, trailers, and semitrailers are not 
covered by personal injury protection coverages in connection with injuries 
incurred while operating any of these vehicles. 
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